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ABSTRACT
An understanding of Internet topology is central to answer
various questions ranging from network resilience to peer se-
lection or data center location. While much of prior work
has examined AS-level connectivity, meaningful and rele-
vant results from such an abstract view of Internet topology
have been limited. For one, semantically, AS relationships
capture business relationships and not physical connectivity.
Additionally, many organizations often use multiple ASes,
either to implement diﬀerent routing policies, or as legacies
from mergers and acquisitions. In this paper, we move be-
yond the traditional AS graph view of the Internet to deﬁne
the problem of AS-to-organization mapping. We describe
our initial steps at automating the capture of the rich se-
mantics inherent in the AS-level ecosystem where routing
and connectivity intersect with organizations. We discuss
preliminary methods that identify multi-AS organizations
from WHOIS data and illustrate the challenges posed by
the quality of the available data and the complexity of real-
world organizational relationships.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—Network topology; C.2.3 [Com-
puter-Communication Networks]: Network Operations—
Network management
General Terms
Measurement
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is of great importance to millions of peo-
ple and businesses today, as a source of information, enter-
tainment, and commerce. Thus resilience of the Internet
to various threats has been the topic of a large number of
research papers [1,5,12–14]. This resilience has also been ex-
tensively discussed in the popular press, especially in cases of
actual outages of popular services, such as the 2008 YouTube
routing problem [16,24], service interruptions for large user
groups [29], loss of connectivity due to peering disputes [25]
or routing errors [22,23], and catastrophic events [4,9,28].
To study Internet resilience, many analyses focus on the
Internet’s AS-level topology. Autonomous systems (ASes)
appear in BGP Internet routing [21] and are deﬁned to rep-
resent a network or group of networks that operate with a
common routing policy [10]. More than 30,000 ASes in the
Internet today form a logical fabric that reﬂects the policy
and business relationships necessary to manage the ﬂow of
Internet traﬃc. ASes and their relationships are an attrac-
tive target for analysis because paths through the AS topol-
ogy are often visible in public routing tables, implying that
the resulting data can be readily mined to obtain the Inter-
net AS-graph [6]. Given the apparent ease with which the
Internet AS-graph can be obtained, it is not surprising that
it features prominently in studies of Internet resilience since
Albert et al. [1]. These studies typically treat the Internet
AS topology as an abstract graph and change it, perhaps by
deleting nodes or removing edges, on the assumption that
these changes predict the outcome of threats to the actual
Internet.
In this paper, we provide evidence that the relationship
between the AS graph and the organizations that make up
the Internet is much richer than previously thought, mak-
ing it diﬃcult to justify conclusions based only on modi-
ﬁcations to the AS graph. Abstracting the Internet to a
simple graph and treating it as a collection of generic nodes
and links ignores much of the rich semantic content inherent
in the key components that make up the AS-level Internet.
This semantic content is critical to its understanding and its
proper use in experiments. Another basic problem that has
been gradually recognized is that obtaining a reasonably ac-
curate AS-graph from available measurements is quite chal-
lenging. Recent work has suggested that presently available
AS graphs are of questionable quality [27], limiting theiruse in careful studies of many Internet connectivity-related
problems.
Motivated by these questions about current approaches,
the ﬁrst contribution of this paper (Section 2) is to move
beyond the traditional AS-graph view, towards a structure
we call AS-level ecosystem. This structure aims to capture
the organizations and their ASes that make up the Inter-
net, along with the realities of router-level connectivity in
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). Consider the frequently
raised questions such as: what damage to the Internet re-
sults from the outage of a particular IXP, or legal action
in a particular country, or a business dispute between orga-
nizations? Answering these requires a deeper understand-
ing of Internet semantics than simply evaluating deletion of
a node or edge in an AS graph, because such prior work
omits the fact that many important organizations operate
multiple ASes. To our knowledge, the only prior recogni-
tion of this fact was in diﬀerences between AS paths derived
from traceroute and BGP routing [11], and PCH’s manually
generated AS/organization directory for network operator
assistance [19].
In Section 3 we present our second contribution, a num-
ber of automated methods for extracting organization-level
relationships from information in the Regional Internet Reg-
istry (RIR) WHOIS databases. This work builds on prior
work [11] to provide a step towards automatic identiﬁcation
of the mapping of ASes to the organization to which they
belong.
A ﬁnal, more indirect, contribution of our work results
from the validation eﬀorts (Section 4). As part of evaluating
our methods, we also characterize the quality and timeliness
of the WHOIS data itself, suggesting opportunities for both
operators, as contributors to and users of this data, and
researchers, as users of the data, to improve the data for
their mutual beneﬁts.
2. THE INTERNET AS ECOSYSTEM
Our goal is to move towards models of the Internet AS
ecosystem, so we consider ASes and organizations, how they
connect, and how we can use this information to improve
performance and evaluate risk.
2.1 ASes and Organizations
Central to our work are ASes and organizations. An Au-
tonomous System (AS) is deﬁned in RFC1930 [10] as “a
connected group of one or more IP preﬁxes run by one or
more network operators which has a single and clearly de-
ﬁned routing policy”. While this deﬁnition is prescriptive,
routing policies are not necessarily enforced or even written
down. A practical, descriptive deﬁnition of an AS would
be whatever is identiﬁed by an AS number in BGP routing
messages.
A precise deﬁnition of organization is more elusive, since
organizations are fundamentally socio-economic arrangements
with many gradations of collaboration or independence. It is
diﬃcult to adopt a formal deﬁnition that is neither too loose,
joining what should be logically separate, nor too strict, sep-
arating business units or subsidiaries that should be joined.
Here we deﬁne an organization is an entity which has control
over itself and is not a subsidiary of any other organization.
(A subsidiary is majority-owned by another organization.)
We adopt this deﬁnition since our emphasis is to join entities
that share common, Internet-relevant business decisions.
2.2 Types of Connectivity
AS relationships can reﬂect a number of diﬀerent contrac-
tual relationships between organizations. Common relation-
ships are peers, customers, providers, and siblings (mutual
transit providers) [8]. Single organizations can use multiple
ASes to facilitate other, more complex arrangements, includ-
ing creating non-uniform routing policies over one organiza-
tion. Note that by their very deﬁnition, AS relationships are
logical or virtual in nature and say little about the physical
connectivity between the ASes in question.
This many-to-one mapping of ASes to organizations mo-
tivates an organization-level view of the AS ecosystem; an-
other explicitly logical graph structure that is coarser-grained
than the traditional AS-graph. Here nodes represent organi-
zations and two organizations are connected if there exists an
AS relationship between at least one aﬃliated AS in each of
the two organizations. Although such an organization-level
view has not attracted much prior attention in the network-
ing literature, it is of critical importance for understanding
organization-level routing.
When considering ASes by themselves, it is important to
recognize that they have a rich internal structure. Depend-
ing on their size, an AS’s physical infrastructure intercon-
nects a number of diﬀerent, geographically dispersed Points-
of-Presence (PoPs). It is generally at these PoPs where the
network connects to its customers and interconnects with
other networks, either directly through Private Network In-
terconnects (PNIs) or via public Internet eXchange Points
(IXPs). IXPs are physical infrastructure managed by third
parties where members (ASes) choose to exchange traﬃc di-
rectly by peering with each other, rather than via upstream
service providers (for a cost) [3]. It is this combination of
physical, AS-level, and organization-level connectivity that
makes the proposed AS ecosystem an ideal candidate for
careful analyses of, for example, threats to and resilience of
the Internet.
2.3 Future Applications from Understanding
An understanding of the AS ecosystem can be applied to
improve performance and manage risk.
Analysis and Planning: An organization-level topology
can assist in Internet analysis. For example, the accuracy
of prior work in AS-peering inference [8] may be improved
by considering AS/organization relationships. These peer-
ing relationships and a direct understanding of organizations
can also inform what-if projections of performance and re-
liability and so help guide selection of additional peering
agreements, or build-outs to new IXPs, or siting of content
provisioning or caches.
Threat Analysis: The centrality of the Internet to ev-
eryday life raises the importance of threat assessment due to
accidental or malicious damage. Goals of attackers or risks
of accidents may vary from partitioning to increased latency
or reduced cross-section bandwidth, or may be more subtle,
such as sending unauthorized traﬃc (e.g., spam) or eaves-
dropping.
Deﬁning threats is aided by what we believe is a non-
threat. It is mathematically true that graphs with power-
law distributions of node degree are extremely robust to ran-
dom node removal, yet highly vulnerable to removal of high-
degree nodes. Yet we believe application of this result to
Internet AS-graphs to predict Internet stability is specious,
because there is no threat corresponding to “delete a node inAll OrgID Phone Email
ARIN 21k (100%) 20K (95%) 20K (94%) 20K (93%)
RIPE 19k (100%) 11K (59%) unavail. 13K (68%)
APNIC 6k (100%) unavail. 4K (67%) 5K (78%)
LACNIC 1.5K (100%) unavail. unavail. unavail.
AfriNIC 0.5K (100%) 0.4K (82%) 0.5K (96%) unavail.
All 48K (100%) 31K (65%) 25K (51%) 38K (79%)
Table 1: Data availability (AS count) for three ﬁelds across
the 5 RIRs.
the AS graph”. Simply put, high-degree ASes cannot sim-
ply “disappear”; even in cases of major bankruptcies (such
as WorldCom in 2004), the aﬀected networks provided ser-
vice throughout reorganization. Instead, we must consider
models and mutations that reﬂect Internet semantics.
As for realizable threats to the Internet’s AS ecosystem,
preﬁx hijacking, organization disputes, and IXP outage are
examples that have actually occurred multiple times in the
past. In route preﬁx hijacking, one AS mistakenly overrides
another AS’s route. Preﬁx hijacking has been both acciden-
tal and intentional [7,22–24]. A de-peering is an intentional
choice by one network to refuse to route traﬃc from a prior
peer [15,26]. IXP outage refers to the fact that IXPs are
physical locations and as such are vulnerable to correlated
physical problems including power outages [4,17], natural
disasters [9], or human-induced problems [28]. While preﬁx
hijacking may appear similar to “deleting an AS”, a care-
ful analysis of this as well as the other two threats shows
that they are not well described by operations on the tradi-
tional AS graphs, but become substantially more complex
problems when networks can connect in multiple locations,
run their business using diﬀerent ASes, or use these diﬀerent
ASes to interconnect at multiple IXPs.
3. DISCOVERING ORGANIZATIONS
The goals of our methodology described next is modest:
we want to understand how eﬀective simple automated clus-
tering is at discovering an AS-to-organization mapping. Our
goal here is to obtain an initial lower bound on accuracy, and
to identify challenges and trade-oﬀs for future methods. We
expect that better results are possible, but will require more
sophisticated information extraction and clustering meth-
ods.
3.1 Data Sources
We depend on AS registration data (i.e., WHOIS data)
to discover AS-to-organization relationships. Unfortunately,
this data is neither complete, nor up-to-date, nor in a com-
mon, simple format. There are ﬁve regional Internet reg-
istries [20] that provide WHOIS data, with RIPE, APNIC,
LACNIC and AfriNIC relying on the Routing Policy Speciﬁ-
cation Language (RPSL) [18], and with ARIN using its own
format [2]. However, given the similarity of the two formats,
we can generally merge them into one.
Our work is concerned with three types of records: those
corresponding to Autonomous Systems (ASes), organi-
zations (orgs, for short), and points-of-contact (contact,
for short). To illustrate the potential of the three types of
records for performing an AS-to-organization mapping, note
that ASes are identiﬁed by ASHandle records in ARIN and
aut-num records in other RIRs (48K AS records, see Ta-
ble 1). Some AS records are associated with an org record
(via the OrgID or org ﬁelds) or administrative/technical
contact information. Org records are intended to facili-
tate the common management of an organization’s multiple
records and are clearly relevant when trying to map ASes to
organizations. Unfortunately, their direct use is complicated
by the fact that RIR policies explicitly allow organizations to
use multiple OrgID records, possibly with diﬀerent OrgID’s.
However, org records often include administrative/technical
points-of-contact information that can provide further clues
about belonging to the same organization. In fact, con-
tact records refer to individuals and can include information
such as name of individual or role, a contact address, tele-
phone numbers, and e-mail addresses. Given the role these
individuals are supposed to play in managing an organiza-
tion’s network operations and responding to inquiries, we
view telephone numbers and e-mail addresses as support-
ing important every-day business interactions and focus on
them as providing promising clues for associating individual
ASes with their parent organization.
The challenges posed by using the OrgID, telephone num-
ber, and e-mail address information buried in the AS, orga-
nization, and contact records are many. For example, only
65% of all AS records contain OrgID information, with AP-
NIC and LACNIC providing none whatsoever; other ASes
provide OrgIDs for the majority of records (59% for RIPE,
82% and 95% for AfriNIC and ARIN). However, even when
coverage is good, many organizations use a number of diﬀer-
ent OrgIDs making OrgID clustering diﬃcult. With respect
to telephone numbers, they are unavailable for RIPE due to
European privacy laws, and are also missing for LACNIC.
Similarly, e-mail addresses are unavailable for LACNIC and
AfriNIC, and partially missing for ARIN, RIPE, and AP-
NIC (see Table 1). Clearly, the performance of any AS-to-
org mapping method that relies exclusively on WHOIS data
will necessarily suﬀer from such missing data issues and may
further be impacted by the largely unknown quality of the
existing WHOIS data.
3.2 BasicClusteringtoIdentifyOrganizations
Our mapping method consists of performing basic clus-
tering on one or a number of diﬀerent (canonicalized) at-
tributes.
1. Extract (raw attributes, AS) pairs from the source
data.
2. Canonicalize to (simple attribute, AS) pairs.
3. Discard generic attributes common to many organiza-
tions.
4. Cluster all ASes with related simple, non-generic at-
tributes: (a) Start a new cluster ci with some unclus-
tered AS ai. Then repeat until no more merges into
ci: (b) Identify ci by the union of attributes of all its
ASes, (c) Merge some other AS aj with some matching
attribute.
5. Label the cluster (Section 3.2.5).
3.2.1 Clustering by organization IDs
Clustering by OrgID is the simplest method and is in-
cluded here as “baseline” and because it is essentially the
method described in the only prior work [11] on this topic.OrgIDs are designed to group ASes into organizations. They
require no canonicalization, but we discard 8“generic”OrgIDs
belonging to 5 RIRs, IANA and 2 Network Information
Centers (NIC). Given that OrgID information is not widely
available and not unique (when available), we expect OrgID
clustering to have poor coverage but no false positives.
3.2.2 Clustering by telephone numbers
When clustering by telephone numbers, we associate them
with ASes by following three paths through WHOIS: AS-
record → org-record, AS-record → contact-record, or AS-
record → org-record → contact-record. We observe multi-
ple telephone numbers with each AS (for administrative, or
technical purposes), so the many-to-many telephone-to-AS
relationship can cluster otherwise separate ASes.
Telephone numbers require both canonicalization (e.g., in-
ferring country code and stripping extensions) and generic
ﬁltering. We manually build a blacklist of 11 generic tele-
phone numbers that includes RIR, IANA, ICANN, and NIC
contact numbers, as well as a few outsourcing companies.
Since only 51% of ASes provide telephone numbers (see Ta-
ble 1), we expect the telephone clustering method to have
relatively poor performance.
3.2.3 Clustering by e-mail domains
To cluster based on e-mail addresses, we associate them
with ASes using the same two- or three-step paths through
WHOIS we relied on for telephone number-based clustering.
In addition, we exploit the fact that many RIPE and AP-
NIC records provide an additional source of administrative-
pertinent e-mail addresses in the changed and notify ﬁelds.
In particular, we retain the e-mail addresses in all notify
ﬁelds and the most recent changed ﬁelds, providing e-mail
coverage in spite of missing point-of-contact records.
Like telephone numbers, e-mail also requires careful canon-
icalization (e.g., discarding the user portion and keeping
only the distinguishing, right-most part of the domain ad-
dress) and generic ﬁltering. Since there is no universal num-
ber of distinguishing components, we compare against a
manually-built list of more than 6K suﬃxes with longest-
suﬃx matching. We build a blacklist of about 50 generic
e-mail domains that takes care of generic e-mail addresses
in use by RIRs, NICs, outsourcing companies, and public
e-mail services like Gmail and Hotmail.
While e-mail addresses capture many relationships inside
organizations, their ﬂexibility has the potential of causing
many false positives. To avoid some of the more obvious
misclassiﬁcations of ASes, we adjust the above basic method
by implementing a simple rule designed to ensure that two
clusters are not merged into one because of an e-mail ad-
dress or domain used by a single individual, associated with
an outsourcing eﬀort, or aﬃliated with an isolated joint ven-
ture.
Given the ubiquity of e-mail in today’s Internet and the
critical role e-mail plays in communication between network
operators within an organization or across diﬀerent compa-
nies, we expect the email clustering to outperform clustering
by OrgID and clustering by telephone numbers.
3.2.4 Hybrid clustering
While each of the above-mentioned (single-attribute) clus-
tering methods has its strengths and weaknesses, we can
combine the diﬀerent types of attributes and develop two-
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Figure 1: Validation based on real ground truth from a Tier-
1 ISP, data availability (top), and biggest-cluster accuracy
(bottom).
or three-attributes clustering method to improve coverage.
Our preferred method is hybrid clustering with all three at-
tributes: OrgID, phone number, and e-mail address.
3.2.5 Cluster Labeling and Selection
While our basic mapping methods generate clusters, they
are arbitrarily grouped, without human-friendly names. To
label clusters, we extract the text names in AS and OrgID
records, including ASName, OrgName, as-name, descr, and
owner ﬁelds. Since a cluster will have many such names,
often with minor variations (Org, Org Inc., Org Europe,
Nippon-Org, etc.), we split these names on word boundaries
to form keywords and rank keywords by their frequency in
the cluster.
Finally, when comparing the accuracy of our methods
against a candidate set of ASes (e.g., ground truth of all
ASes belonging to an organization), we have to decide with
which cluster to compare among the typically many clusters
produced by a given method. For the sake of simplicity, we
always compare to the largest cluster produced by the par-
ticular method, biasing in favor of both better coverage and
larger number of false-positives (see also Section 4).
4. VALIDATION
We next evaluate accuracy and false positives and nega-
tives of each approach. We ﬁrst consider real ground truth
from one organization’s operator, then inferred ground truth
of nine organizations as determined by manual inspection of
public records.
4.1 Validation with Organization Input
We ﬁrst compare our approaches against real ground truthobtained from network operators of a Tier-1 ISP. We caution
that, while we have good conﬁdence in the ground truth we
were able to obtain, even operations staﬀ suggest that this
data may be incomplete.
Figure 1 shows the results of our analysis with each of
our methods for the Tier-1 ISP. As a baseline, we take the
ground truth of 213 ASes provided to us by the network
operators. Of these 213 (100%), the top part of the ﬁgure
shows that we have data of only 177 (83%) to 195 (92%)
ASes for the non-hybrid methods, depending on attribute;
one AS is simply missing from our bulk WHOIS data, with
others omitting attributes in the data or using only generic
attributes. However, by combining all three attributes to-
gether (OrgID+phone+email), the data availability rises to
98%. Thus missing or generic data leads to 8–17% of the un-
dercount (false negatives) for the non-hybrid methods and
2%–8% for the hybrid methods.
Our automated clustering methods produce 21–50 clus-
ters that overlap with the Tier-1 ISP, many with relevant
keywords.
Selecting the largest cluster (see Section 3.2.5), we ﬁrst
compare the completeness (true-positive rate) of our sev-
eral approaches. We see that e-mail has signiﬁcantly better
coverage than other approaches, ﬁnding 71% of ASes with
records and 59% of ground truth, compared to 30% for tele-
phone number and 27% for OrgID. E-mail provides better
coverage because, unlike OrgID and phone numbers, e-mail
addresses for diﬀerent contacts can be loosely matched to
cluster disparate ASes.
We next consider false positives: ASes mis-matched into
the Tier-1 ISP. While our e-mail method gives better cov-
erage, it also allows false positives. Examination of the AS
record details shows 3 due to stale or incorrect data, 7 due
to technical setup help, 5 due to former customer relation-
ship, and 3 wrongly clustered because they share related
attributes with 2 of these 5 ASes.
The main reason for false positives is therefore the spec-
trum of relationships between organizations—with technical
support, outsourcing and joint ventures, there often is no
clean organizational boundary. In 7 of 18 false positives due
to e-mail clustering, we see examples of ASes acquired for
customers. A secondary reason is outdated information in
WHOIS, accounting for 3 of the 18 e-mail false positives.
Finally, we examine why we miss clusters (false negatives).
For e-mail, 17% is due to missing or generic data, and most
of these (30 of 36) are registration records using generic e-
mail addresses. Clustering is diﬃcult when operational and
customer e-mail use the same domain. For the 52 with
WHOIS data that do link to the main cluster, the domi-
nant cause (35 of 52) is due to mergers where all WHOIS
data remains in the original company’s identity, with a few
(5) due to independent business units not obviously linked
to the parent, and some more (9) with outdated records.
Three records indicate outsourced WHOIS handling, which
may be related to agreements made prior to organizational
changes.
Overall, we ﬁnd the main clustering problem is due to
registration with generic e-mail addresses and mergers that
maintain all aspects of original identity, and apparently in-
dependent business units, together accounting for 33% of
our missing ground truth (70 of 213) and 80% of what is
missing from our cluster.
We speculate that loose matching on the names of ASes
may help correct these errors. Technical support, outsourc-
ing, both as a service oﬀered by the Tier-1 ISP and by ac-
quisitions cause many false positives (7 of 18) and a few false
negatives (3 of 213). Stale/incorrect data and organizational
churn account for a handful of the remaining (3 and 9 false
positives and negatives).
Hybrid methods combine diﬀerent types of attributes to-
gether to achieve a higher true-positive rate with the po-
tential sacriﬁce of false-positive rate. We ﬁrst start from
the OrgID method with 27% coverage, then gradually add
phone and email attributes. The coverage rises from 27% to
33% then to 64%, but also with a 2% and 11% increase on
false-positive rate.
4.2 Validation with External Observation
We next compare our methods against manually collected
estimates of clusters for nine diﬀerent organizations (each
with multiple ASes): four telecommunications companies,
Verizon (234 ASes), Comcast (48), Time Warner (35), and
China Mobile (CN Mobile) (10); four content providers, Ya-
hoo (76), Akamai (32), Google (21), and Limelight (11); and
a root-DNS provider, Internet Systems Consortium (ISC,
55). Unlike Section 4.1, the ground truth here is weaker:
for each of the organizations we did our best to determine
their ASes based on examination of public documents, rout-
ing data, and WHOIS data. Given the diﬃcultly in get-
ting strong ground truth even with operator cooperation,
we know of no better way to conﬁrm our results.
We ﬁrst consider data availability (Figure 2, top). Just as
the Tier-1 ISP was missing 8–17% of each kind of attribute,
we see that most cases are missing up to 30% of attributes.
In about half the cases (CN Mobile, Yahoo, Akamai, Lime-
light, ISC), many or all OrgIDs are missing; this deﬁcit is
due to poor or no OrgID coverage in APNIC/LACNIC and
RIPE. We conclude that use of multiple attributes is impor-
tant to provide good coverage.
Turning to coverage (Figure 2, bottom), we see that in
most cases, coverage (true positives) is as good or better
for these organizations compared to the Tier-1 ISP, partic-
ularly for e-mail and hybrid methods. However, for Google
and Limelight, they are consistently worse, and OrgID cov-
erage is very bad for these and Verizon, CN Mobile, and
Yahoo. Coverage problems with OrgID are mainly due to
attribute availability, and because some organizations such
as Verizon use many (48) OrgIDs. Limelight’s 11 inferred
ground truth ASes break into two parts, one containing its 7
North American ASes and the other containing its 4 Asian
ASes, each with separate contact information and so result-
ing in low coverage by all methods. Finally, Google is an
unusual case because, while it has acquired other compa-
nies like YouTube, DoubleClick, GrandCentral and Picnik,
to date it has done little consolidation of its RIR data.
We see a wider range of false positives for these organi-
zations. Several show none (CN Mobile, Comcast, Google,
Yahoo, Akamai) or a few, similar to the Tier-1 ISP (Verizon,
TW Cable, Limelight). However, ISC shows a large num-
ber of false positives with phone or phone-related hybrid
clustering. For ISC, these errors are due to outsourcing ar-
rangements by individuals at ISC with other organizations.
Overall, we ﬁnd this broader study conﬁrms our main
observations seen in the Tier-1 ISP, although they show a
broader range of reactions.orgid
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Figure 2: Validation based on inferred ground truth of 9 organizations data coverage (top) accuracy (bottom). Comparison
between inferred ground truth and the biggest cluster by each method.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has deﬁned the problem and challenges of asso-
ciating ASes with organizations and has described our ﬁrst
approach that uses WHOIS data from the RIRs. Although
the WHOIS database has incorrect, missing, and outdated
entries, it also has valuable information. However, relying on
this data turns tasks such as clustering ASes by organization
into hard problems. While the ad-hoc clustering method de-
scribed in this paper shows promise, a proper AS clustering
mechanism will (i) require incorporating methods for giv-
ing higher importance to attributes that are more critical
to the business of running an AS, and (ii) necessitate ways
to bring in additional ambient information for associating
existing ASes with their parent organization. Developing a
more informed AS clustering algorithm and running it on the
nearly 30,000 ASes in the Internet is part of our future work
and we hope it will lay the groundwork to better understand
the characterisitcs of the Internet ecosystem.
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